Consider the following preference table for three voters: $$\begin{array} { l l l l }
\text { First choice } & \text { C } & \text { D } & \text { D } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { B } & \text { B } & \text { A } \
\text { Third choice } & \text { D } & \text { C } & \text { B } \
\text { Fourth choice } & \text { A } & \text { A } & \text { C }
\end{array}$$ If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the right or in the middle manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit?
A) neither the voter on the right nor in the middle can
B) only the voter on the right can
C) only the voter in the middle can
D) both voters can

Question

Consider the following preference table for three voters: $$\begin{array} { l l l l } 
\text { First choice } & \text { C } & \text { D } & \text { D } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { B } & \text { B } & \text { A } \
\text { Third choice } & \text { D } & \text { C } & \text { B } \
\text { Fourth choice } & \text { A } & \text { A } & \text { C }
\end{array}$$ If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the right or in the middle manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit?
A) neither the voter on the right nor in the middle can
B) only the voter on the right can
C) only the voter in the middle can
D) both voters can

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

In a Borda count, points are assigned based on the position of each choice (1st choice gets the most points, last choice gets the least). Manipulation would require a voter to change their vote to alter the outcome in their favor. Given the table, changing the order of preferences by any single voter would not change the overall outcome due to the distribution of preferences among the other voters.

Consider the Following Preference Table for Three Voters If a Borda Count Is Used, Can the Voter on l