Consider the following preference table for two voters: $$\begin{array} { l l l }
\text { First choice } & \text { C } & \text { A } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { D } & \text { D } \
\text { Third choice } & B & B \
\text { Fourth choice } & A & C
\end{array}$$ If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the left manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit with no ties for the winner?

Question

Consider the following preference table for two voters: $$\begin{array} { l l l } 
\text { First choice } & \text { C } & \text { A } \
\text { Second choice } & \text { D } & \text { D } \
\text { Third choice } & B & B \
\text { Fourth choice } & A & C
\end{array}$$ If a Borda count is used, can the voter on the left manipulate the outcome to his or her benefit with no ties for the winner?

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

In a Borda count, each position on a voter's preference list is assigned a point value (with higher positions receiving more points), and the candidate with the highest total points wins. Given the table, the points awarded would be as follows: A (1+3=4 points), B (2+2=4 points), C (4+1=5 points), D (3+4=7 points). The voter on the left cannot manipulate the outcome to change the winner (D in this case) by changing their vote, as their preferred candidate (C) cannot surpass D in total points regardless of their manipulation, assuming no ties for the winner are allowed.

Consider the Following Preference Table for Two Voters If a Borda Count Is Used, Can the Voter on l