Consider a sequential game in which the police move first,choosing which of two sites to defend, And ,against terrorism.After observing this choice,the terrorist moves second,choosing which site to attack.The attack only succeeds against an undefended target.A successful attack on Causes more damage than against The police's objective is to minimize and the terrorist's to maximize damage.What outcome characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium?
A)Cannot tell without more information
B)Police defends ,and terrorist attacks
C)Police defends ,and terrorist attacks
D)Police randomize between targets

Question

Consider a sequential game in which the police move first,choosing which of two sites to defend, And  ,against terrorism.After observing this choice,the terrorist moves second,choosing which site to attack.The attack only succeeds against an undefended target.A successful attack on  Causes more damage than against  The police's objective is to minimize and the terrorist's to maximize damage.What outcome characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium? ​
A)​Cannot tell without more information 
B)​Police defends ,and terrorist attacks 
C)​Police defends ,and terrorist attacks 
D)​Police randomize between targets

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The police will choose to defend the site with lower damage if they are rational. The terrorist will then choose to attack the site with lower defense. This leads to the outcome where the police defends 11ea69cd_9b4b_8043_b0c5_07d4dc63f509_TB5166_11 and the terrorist attacks 11ea69cd_9b4b_8044_b0c5_3f1a10a90067_TB5166_11. This outcome represents the subgame perfect equilibrium.

Consider a Sequential Game in Which the Police Move First,choosing