There are two types of worker,high ability and low ability.High ability workers generate gross profit of A on the job and low ability generate nothing.Education does not make workers more productive,but is costly to obtain (cH for high ability workers and cL for low ability ones) .Let w be the wage that all firms in the economy pay by regulatory mandate.Suppose the worker obtains utility given by the wage (if the worker is employed,0 if not) minus the cost of education (if any) .There is no disutility from work.Which condition is required if only the high ability type is to obtain an education in equilibrium?
A) cH < w < cL..
B) cL < w < cH.
C) cH < cL < w.
D) cL < cH < w.
Correct Answer:
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