Bayesian updating in a separating equilibrium implies the initially uninformed player will fully know what type he is playing when he has to make his move.
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Q21: If a pooling equilibrium is played in
Q22: Consider player n in a sequential game.
a.If
Q23: In a simultaneous move, incomplete information game
Q24: The Folk Theorem says that anything can
Q25: If a separating equilibrium is played in
Q27: A dominant strategy is one that is
Q28: Dominant strategy Nash equilibria are efficient.
Q29: If a player's strategy in a sequential
Q30: A Prisoner's Dilemma game is one in
Q31: If a pooling equilibrium is played in
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