In a labor-market pooling equilibrium with high-skill and low-skill workers and where a costly educational degree is used as a signaling device,
A) the high-skill workers' wage is larger than the low-skill workers' wage.
B) the low-skill workers' wage is zero.
C) the high- and low-skill workers receive the same wage.
D) the high-skill workers' wage is equal to the low-skill workers' wage plus the cost of obtaining a degree.

Question

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The Answer of In a labor-market pooling equilibrium with high-skill and low-skill workers and where a costly educational degree is used as a signaling device,
A) the high-skill workers' wage is larger than the low-skill workers' wage.
B) the low-skill workers' wage is zero.
C) the high- and low-skill workers receive the same wage.
D) the high-skill workers' wage is equal to the low-skill workers' wage plus the cost of obtaining a degree.

In a Labor-Market Pooling Equilibrium with High-Skill and Low-Skill Workers