-Consider the entry advertising game depicted in Figure 13.8. Payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If David advertizes on TV, there is a 70 percent probability that Goliath will advertize on the radio and an 30 percent probability that Goliath will advertize in newspapers. If David advertizes in magazines, there is a 50 percent probability that Goliath will advertize on the radio or in newspapers. If David is risk neutral, what is the subgame perfect equilibrium for this game?
A) {TV 6 Radio}
B) {TV 6 Newspapers}
C) {Magazines 6 Radio}
D) {Magazines 6 Newspapers}

Question

-Consider the entry advertising game depicted in Figure 13.8. Payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If David advertizes on TV, there is a 70 percent probability that Goliath will advertize on the radio and an 30 percent probability that Goliath will advertize in newspapers. If David advertizes in magazines, there is a 50 percent probability that Goliath will advertize on the radio or in newspapers. If David is risk neutral, what is the subgame perfect equilibrium for this game?
A) {TV 6 Radio} 
B) {TV 6 Newspapers} 
C) {Magazines 6 Radio} 
D) {Magazines 6 Newspapers}

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The Answer of 
-Consider the entry advertising game depicted in Figure 13.8. Payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If David advertizes on TV, there is a 70 percent probability that Goliath will advertize on the radio and an 30 percent probability that Goliath will advertize in newspapers. If David advertizes in magazines, there is a 50 percent probability that Goliath will advertize on the radio or in newspapers. If David is risk neutral, what is the subgame perfect equilibrium for this game?
A) {TV 6 Radio} 
B) {TV 6 Newspapers} 
C) {Magazines 6 Radio} 
D) {Magazines 6 Newspapers}

-Consider the Entry Advertising Game Depicted in Figure 13