Quiz 7: Blowing the Whistle

Good Money B en is a sales team leader at a large chain of tire stores. The company is aggressive and is opening new stores every month. Ben is very ambitious and sees plenty of opportunities to move up in the organization-especially if he is able to make a name for himself as a star salesman. As with any retail organization, Ben's company is driven by sales, and it is constantly experimenting with new sales campaigns and incentive programs for its salespeople. Ben didn't expect this morning's sales meeting to be any different-a new incentive tied to a new campaign, supported by a big media campaign in the local area. Ben's boss, John, didn't waste any time in getting to the point of the meeting: "OK guys, I have some big news. Rather than simply negotiating short-term incentives on specific brands to generate sales, the company has signed an exclusive contract with Benfield Tires to take every tire produced in the new Voyager line. That exclusive contract comes with a huge discount based on serious volume. In other words, the more tires we sell, the more money we'll make-and I'm talking about good money for the company and very good bonus money for you-so put everybody into these tires. If we do well in this first contract with Benfield, there could be other exclusives down the road. This could be the beginning of something big for us." John then laid out the details on the sales incentive and showed Ben and his fellow team leaders how they could earn thousands of dollars in bonuses over the next couple of months if they pushed the new Benfield Voyagers. Ben could certainly use the money, but he was concerned about pushing a new tire model so aggressively when it was an unknown in the marketplace. He decided to talk to their most experienced tire mechanic, Rick. Rick had worked for the company for over 25 years-so long that many of the younger guys joked that he either had tire rubber in his veins or had apprenticed on Henry Ford's Model T. "So, Rick, what do you think about these new Benfield Voyagers?" asked Ben. "Are they really such a good deal for our customers, or are they just a moneymaker for us?" Rick was very direct in his response: "I took a look at some of the specs on them, and they don't look good. I think Benfield is sacrificing quality to cut costs. By the standards of some of our other suppliers, these tires would qualify as 'seconds'-and pretty bad ones too. You couldn't pay me to put them on my car-they're good for 15,000 miles at the most. We're taking a big risk promoting these tires as our top model." If Ben decides to raise concerns about the product quality of the Benfield Voyagers, he will become a whistleblower. The difference between internal and external whistle-blowing is explained on page 140. Which approach should Ben follow if he does decide to raise his concerns?

Visit the Government Accountability Project (GAP) at www.whistleblower.org. a. What is the mission of GAP? b. How is GAP funded? c. What kind of assistance is available through GAP for someone thinking about becoming a whistle-blower?

What is a whistle-blower?

Why are whistle-blowers regarded as models of honor and integrity?

Guilt by omission. Divide into two groups, and prepare arguments for and against the following behavior: You work for a large retail clothing company that spends a large amount of its advertising budget emphasizing that its clothes are "Made in America." You discover that only 15 percent of its garments are actually "made" in America. The other 85 percent are actually either cut from patterns overseas and assembled here in the United States or cut and assembled overseas and imported as completed garments. Your hometown depends on this clothing company as the largest local employer. Several of your friends and family work at the local garment assembly factory. Should you go public with this information?

Good Money B en is a sales team leader at a large chain of tire stores. The company is aggressive and is opening new stores every month. Ben is very ambitious and sees plenty of opportunities to move up in the organization-especially if he is able to make a name for himself as a star salesman. As with any retail organization, Ben's company is driven by sales, and it is constantly experimenting with new sales campaigns and incentive programs for its salespeople. Ben didn't expect this morning's sales meeting to be any different-a new incentive tied to a new campaign, supported by a big media campaign in the local area. Ben's boss, John, didn't waste any time in getting to the point of the meeting: "OK guys, I have some big news. Rather than simply negotiating short-term incentives on specific brands to generate sales, the company has signed an exclusive contract with Benfield Tires to take every tire produced in the new Voyager line. That exclusive contract comes with a huge discount based on serious volume. In other words, the more tires we sell, the more money we'll make-and I'm talking about good money for the company and very good bonus money for you-so put everybody into these tires. If we do well in this first contract with Benfield, there could be other exclusives down the road. This could be the beginning of something big for us." John then laid out the details on the sales incentive and showed Ben and his fellow team leaders how they could earn thousands of dollars in bonuses over the next couple of months if they pushed the new Benfield Voyagers. Ben could certainly use the money, but he was concerned about pushing a new tire model so aggressively when it was an unknown in the marketplace. He decided to talk to their most experienced tire mechanic, Rick. Rick had worked for the company for over 25 years-so long that many of the younger guys joked that he either had tire rubber in his veins or had apprenticed on Henry Ford's Model T. "So, Rick, what do you think about these new Benfield Voyagers?" asked Ben. "Are they really such a good deal for our customers, or are they just a moneymaker for us?" Rick was very direct in his response: "I took a look at some of the specs on them, and they don't look good. I think Benfield is sacrificing quality to cut costs. By the standards of some of our other suppliers, these tires would qualify as 'seconds'-and pretty bad ones too. You couldn't pay me to put them on my car-they're good for 15,000 miles at the most. We're taking a big risk promoting these tires as our top model." The five conditions that must exist for whistle-blowing to be ethical are outlined on pages 140-141. Has Rick given Ben enough information to be concerned about the Benfield Voyagers?

Visit the National Whistleblowers Center at www.whistleblowers.org. a. Using the interactive map, select one country and summarize the whistle-blowing activity in that country. b. Identify the whistle-blower protections in effect in your home state.

What is internal whistle-blowing?

How would you act in the following situations? What would you do if your company did not have a whistle-blowing policy?

Which whistle-blowing option is better for an organization-internal or external? Why?

"Tortious interference." Divide into two groups, and prepare arguments for and against the following behavior: In the case of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand and the Brown Williamson Tobacco Company, the CBS Broadcasting Company chose not to air Dr. Wigand's 60 Minutes interview with Mike Wallace under threat of legal action for "tortious interference" between B W and Dr. Wigand. There were suspicions that CBS was more concerned about avoiding any potential legal action that could derail its pending sale to the Westinghouse Corporation. Was CBS behaving ethically in putting the welfare of its stakeholders in the Westinghouse deal ahead of its obligation to support Dr. Wigand?

There are now two whistle-blowing websites separated by only one letter: Summarize their differences, and propose which one offers the greatest assistance to a potential whistle-blower.

What is external whistle-blowing?

How would you act in the following situations? You later discover that one of the drivers was not a part of the scheme but was fired anyway when the information was made public. What do you do?

Why would an organization decide to ignore evidence presented by a whistle-blower?

A new approach to freshness. Divide into two groups, and prepare arguments for and against the following behavior: You work in the meat department of store 2795 of a large retail grocery chain. The company recently announced a change in the meat-handling protocols from the primary supplier. Starting in January 2014, the meat will be gassed with carbon monoxide before packaging. This retains a brighter color for the meat and delays the discoloration that usually occurs as the meat begins to spoil. You understand from the memo that there will be no information on the product label to indicate this protocol change and that the company has no plans to notify customers of this new process. Should you speak out about the procedure?

Is whistle-blowing a good thing?

How would you act in the following situations? Should the driver get his job back? Why or why not?

Is it reasonable for a whistle-blower to expect a guarantee of anonymity?

California organic. Divide into two groups and prepare arguments for and against the following behavior: You work in the accounting department of a family-owned mushroom grower based in California that sells premium organic mushrooms to local restaurants and high-end retail grocery stores. The company's product range includes both fresh and dried mushrooms. Your organic certification allows you to charge top dollar for your product, but you notice from invoices that operating costs are increasing significantly without any increase in revenues. The market won't absorb a price increase, so the company has to absorb the higher costs and accept lower profits. One day you notice invoices for the purchase of dried mushrooms from a Japanese supplier. The dried mushrooms are not listed as being organic, but they are apparently being added to your company's dried mushrooms, which are labeled organic and California-grown. Should you speak out about this?

List five conditions for whistle-blowing to be considered ethical.

Why would a whistle-blower be concerned about retaliation?

Under what condition could whistle-blowing be considered unethical?

Why is trust such an important issue in whistle-blowing?

If you blow the whistle on a company for a personal vendetta against another employee but receive no financial reward, is that more or less ethical that doing it just for the money?

Would the lack of any financial reward make you more or less willing to consider being a whistle-blower? Why?

If an employee blows the whistle on an organization on the basis of a rumor, is that ethical?

If that information turns out to be false, should the employee be liable for damages? Explain your answer.

Compensation under Dodd-Frank isn't as clear as the percentage of the funds recovered for a government whistle-blower. Does that make it less likely that we'll see more whistle-blowing under Dodd-Frank?

Under SOX, complaining to the media isn't recognized as whistle-blowing. Is that ethical?

How should managers or supervisors respond to an employee who brings evidence of questionable behavior to their attention?

Should that employee be given any reassurances of protection for making the tough decision to come forward?

Do you think a hotline that guarantees the anonymity of the caller will encourage more employees to come forward?

Does your company have a whistle-blower hotline? How did you find out that there is (or isn't) one?

Birkenfeld is adamant that his prison sentence is unfair when compared to the fact that no one else (Olenicoff, UBS bankers) went to jail. Does he have a point?

Why did UBS elect to settle with the U.S. Government?

Given that there was an immunity agreement in place, what did the Justice Department gain from prosecuting Birkenfeld?

Critics are concerned that Birkenfeld's prison sentence will discourage other tax whistle-blowers from coming forward. Is that a valid concern? Why or why not?

OLYMPUS: PAYING A PRICE FOR DOING WHAT'S RIGHT? Movies like Silkwood and The Insider have portrayed whistle-blowers as lone heroes on the front line or in middle management, working against corrupt organizations at great personal risk to their own well-being. At Olympus Corporation, the Japanese camera and medical equipment manufacturer, the story was dramatically different. The whistle-blower in this case was recently appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Michael Woodford. As the former head of both UK and U.S. operations for Olympus, Woodford's appointment as CEO in February 2011 was recognized as both the summation of a meteoric rise of a talented young executive and as a sign that the insular corporate culture of "Japan, Inc." was finally changing. Woodford had benefited greatly from the tutelage and mentorship of Olympus Chairman Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, which made the story of Woodford's first few months at the helm even more distressing. As part of a regular review of Tokyo operations, Woodford began analyzing four separate acquisitions that Olympus had made between 2006 and 2009. Three of the four-a recycling company, a cosmetics company, and a food container company-had cost Olympus $1 billion, but their assets had already been written down to just a fraction of that on the balance sheet, indicating that they were considered to be of no real value to the corporation. Further investigation revealed that all three companies were registered in the Caribbean tax haven Cayman Islands. In addition, all three companies were dissolved and closed shortly after being acquired by Olympus. The fourth company-a UK-based medical instruments company called Gyrus-was acquired for $2.2 billion in 2008. The purchase included a $687 million "transaction fee" to two investment bankers, with the funds going into a Cayman Islands account that was also closed shortly after the deal was concluded. Given that investmentbanking fees typically amount to only 1 percent of the transaction, a fee of almost 33 percent was suspicious enough to warrant an independent audit, which the Olympus board had authorized in October 2009. The audit report subsequently declared that the company's directors had done nothing wrong. In an October 11, 2011, memo to Kikukawa, Michael Woodford expressed his suspicions that a series of clear accounting irregularities had destroyed "$1.3bn of shareholder value" in what he described as "a catalogue of calamitous errors and exceptionally poor judgment." The memo concluded with a call for Kikukawa to resign as chairman of Olympus Corporation. Three days later, Kikukawa and his board of directors responded by firing Woodford from his position as CEO. Woodford's personal account of the days that followed his termination reads like a spy novel. Fearing for his life on the basis of a personal belief that the accounting scandal involved members of the yakuza -the Japanese mafia-Woodford left Japan for the United Kingdom very shortly afterward. It was later reported that Woodford was able to provide sufficient evidence to warrant investigation into his claims by the FBI, Scotland Yard's Serious Crime Unit, and Tokyo's Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission. After weeks of denials-and a disconcerting silence among Japan's regulators and mainstream media-the company was forced to concede in the face of incontrovertible evidence that it had misappropriated funds in order to hide investment losses dating back to the 1990s. Public promises were made to introduce a new Corporate Governance Committee and to release five years' worth of revised financial accounts. Kikukawa finally admitted to fraud and stepped down as chairman of Olympus Corporation. He, along with two other Olympus executives, will face up to 10 years in jail for his role in the scandal. In June 2012, Olympus announced that its board of directors had approved a settlement offer with Woodford of 1.2 billion yen ($15.4 million) for unfair dismissal, but the financial impact of the scandal may be far from over. The stock price had plummeted by as much as 80 percent in the immediate postscandal period, and in November 2012, the company announced that 48 mostly foreign institutional investors and pension funds had filed a lawsuit seeking 19.1 billion yen ($240 million) in compensation for investment losses resulting from the revelation of accounting irregularities. What accounting irregularities did Michael Woodford uncover at Olympus?

OLYMPUS: PAYING A PRICE FOR DOING WHAT'S RIGHT? Movies like Silkwood and The Insider have portrayed whistle-blowers as lone heroes on the front line or in middle management, working against corrupt organizations at great personal risk to their own well-being. At Olympus Corporation, the Japanese camera and medical equipment manufacturer, the story was dramatically different. The whistle-blower in this case was recently appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Michael Woodford. As the former head of both UK and U.S. operations for Olympus, Woodford's appointment as CEO in February 2011 was recognized as both the summation of a meteoric rise of a talented young executive and as a sign that the insular corporate culture of "Japan, Inc." was finally changing. Woodford had benefited greatly from the tutelage and mentorship of Olympus Chairman Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, which made the story of Woodford's first few months at the helm even more distressing. As part of a regular review of Tokyo operations, Woodford began analyzing four separate acquisitions that Olympus had made between 2006 and 2009. Three of the four-a recycling company, a cosmetics company, and a food container company-had cost Olympus $1 billion, but their assets had already been written down to just a fraction of that on the balance sheet, indicating that they were considered to be of no real value to the corporation. Further investigation revealed that all three companies were registered in the Caribbean tax haven Cayman Islands. In addition, all three companies were dissolved and closed shortly after being acquired by Olympus. The fourth company-a UK-based medical instruments company called Gyrus-was acquired for $2.2 billion in 2008. The purchase included a $687 million "transaction fee" to two investment bankers, with the funds going into a Cayman Islands account that was also closed shortly after the deal was concluded. Given that investmentbanking fees typically amount to only 1 percent of the transaction, a fee of almost 33 percent was suspicious enough to warrant an independent audit, which the Olympus board had authorized in October 2009. The audit report subsequently declared that the company's directors had done nothing wrong. In an October 11, 2011, memo to Kikukawa, Michael Woodford expressed his suspicions that a series of clear accounting irregularities had destroyed "$1.3bn of shareholder value" in what he described as "a catalogue of calamitous errors and exceptionally poor judgment." The memo concluded with a call for Kikukawa to resign as chairman of Olympus Corporation. Three days later, Kikukawa and his board of directors responded by firing Woodford from his position as CEO. Woodford's personal account of the days that followed his termination reads like a spy novel. Fearing for his life on the basis of a personal belief that the accounting scandal involved members of the yakuza -the Japanese mafia-Woodford left Japan for the United Kingdom very shortly afterward. It was later reported that Woodford was able to provide sufficient evidence to warrant investigation into his claims by the FBI, Scotland Yard's Serious Crime Unit, and Tokyo's Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission. After weeks of denials-and a disconcerting silence among Japan's regulators and mainstream media-the company was forced to concede in the face of incontrovertible evidence that it had misappropriated funds in order to hide investment losses dating back to the 1990s. Public promises were made to introduce a new Corporate Governance Committee and to release five years' worth of revised financial accounts. Kikukawa finally admitted to fraud and stepped down as chairman of Olympus Corporation. He, along with two other Olympus executives, will face up to 10 years in jail for his role in the scandal. In June 2012, Olympus announced that its board of directors had approved a settlement offer with Woodford of 1.2 billion yen ($15.4 million) for unfair dismissal, but the financial impact of the scandal may be far from over. The stock price had plummeted by as much as 80 percent in the immediate postscandal period, and in November 2012, the company announced that 48 mostly foreign institutional investors and pension funds had filed a lawsuit seeking 19.1 billion yen ($240 million) in compensation for investment losses resulting from the revelation of accounting irregularities. How did the executive leadership respond to Woodford's revelations?

OLYMPUS: PAYING A PRICE FOR DOING WHAT'S RIGHT? Movies like Silkwood and The Insider have portrayed whistle-blowers as lone heroes on the front line or in middle management, working against corrupt organizations at great personal risk to their own well-being. At Olympus Corporation, the Japanese camera and medical equipment manufacturer, the story was dramatically different. The whistle-blower in this case was recently appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Michael Woodford. As the former head of both UK and U.S. operations for Olympus, Woodford's appointment as CEO in February 2011 was recognized as both the summation of a meteoric rise of a talented young executive and as a sign that the insular corporate culture of "Japan, Inc." was finally changing. Woodford had benefited greatly from the tutelage and mentorship of Olympus Chairman Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, which made the story of Woodford's first few months at the helm even more distressing. As part of a regular review of Tokyo operations, Woodford began analyzing four separate acquisitions that Olympus had made between 2006 and 2009. Three of the four-a recycling company, a cosmetics company, and a food container company-had cost Olympus $1 billion, but their assets had already been written down to just a fraction of that on the balance sheet, indicating that they were considered to be of no real value to the corporation. Further investigation revealed that all three companies were registered in the Caribbean tax haven Cayman Islands. In addition, all three companies were dissolved and closed shortly after being acquired by Olympus. The fourth company-a UK-based medical instruments company called Gyrus-was acquired for $2.2 billion in 2008. The purchase included a $687 million "transaction fee" to two investment bankers, with the funds going into a Cayman Islands account that was also closed shortly after the deal was concluded. Given that investmentbanking fees typically amount to only 1 percent of the transaction, a fee of almost 33 percent was suspicious enough to warrant an independent audit, which the Olympus board had authorized in October 2009. The audit report subsequently declared that the company's directors had done nothing wrong. In an October 11, 2011, memo to Kikukawa, Michael Woodford expressed his suspicions that a series of clear accounting irregularities had destroyed "$1.3bn of shareholder value" in what he described as "a catalogue of calamitous errors and exceptionally poor judgment." The memo concluded with a call for Kikukawa to resign as chairman of Olympus Corporation. Three days later, Kikukawa and his board of directors responded by firing Woodford from his position as CEO. Woodford's personal account of the days that followed his termination reads like a spy novel. Fearing for his life on the basis of a personal belief that the accounting scandal involved members of the yakuza -the Japanese mafia-Woodford left Japan for the United Kingdom very shortly afterward. It was later reported that Woodford was able to provide sufficient evidence to warrant investigation into his claims by the FBI, Scotland Yard's Serious Crime Unit, and Tokyo's Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission. After weeks of denials-and a disconcerting silence among Japan's regulators and mainstream media-the company was forced to concede in the face of incontrovertible evidence that it had misappropriated funds in order to hide investment losses dating back to the 1990s. Public promises were made to introduce a new Corporate Governance Committee and to release five years' worth of revised financial accounts. Kikukawa finally admitted to fraud and stepped down as chairman of Olympus Corporation. He, along with two other Olympus executives, will face up to 10 years in jail for his role in the scandal. In June 2012, Olympus announced that its board of directors had approved a settlement offer with Woodford of 1.2 billion yen ($15.4 million) for unfair dismissal, but the financial impact of the scandal may be far from over. The stock price had plummeted by as much as 80 percent in the immediate postscandal period, and in November 2012, the company announced that 48 mostly foreign institutional investors and pension funds had filed a lawsuit seeking 19.1 billion yen ($240 million) in compensation for investment losses resulting from the revelation of accounting irregularities. Critics argue that Woodford could have been more effective if he had taken a longer-term approach to addressing the accounting scandal, rather than the "showdown" approach he took with Kikukawa. Is that a fair assessment? Why or why not?

OLYMPUS: PAYING A PRICE FOR DOING WHAT'S RIGHT? Movies like Silkwood and The Insider have portrayed whistle-blowers as lone heroes on the front line or in middle management, working against corrupt organizations at great personal risk to their own well-being. At Olympus Corporation, the Japanese camera and medical equipment manufacturer, the story was dramatically different. The whistle-blower in this case was recently appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Michael Woodford. As the former head of both UK and U.S. operations for Olympus, Woodford's appointment as CEO in February 2011 was recognized as both the summation of a meteoric rise of a talented young executive and as a sign that the insular corporate culture of "Japan, Inc." was finally changing. Woodford had benefited greatly from the tutelage and mentorship of Olympus Chairman Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, which made the story of Woodford's first few months at the helm even more distressing. As part of a regular review of Tokyo operations, Woodford began analyzing four separate acquisitions that Olympus had made between 2006 and 2009. Three of the four-a recycling company, a cosmetics company, and a food container company-had cost Olympus $1 billion, but their assets had already been written down to just a fraction of that on the balance sheet, indicating that they were considered to be of no real value to the corporation. Further investigation revealed that all three companies were registered in the Caribbean tax haven Cayman Islands. In addition, all three companies were dissolved and closed shortly after being acquired by Olympus. The fourth company-a UK-based medical instruments company called Gyrus-was acquired for $2.2 billion in 2008. The purchase included a $687 million "transaction fee" to two investment bankers, with the funds going into a Cayman Islands account that was also closed shortly after the deal was concluded. Given that investmentbanking fees typically amount to only 1 percent of the transaction, a fee of almost 33 percent was suspicious enough to warrant an independent audit, which the Olympus board had authorized in October 2009. The audit report subsequently declared that the company's directors had done nothing wrong. In an October 11, 2011, memo to Kikukawa, Michael Woodford expressed his suspicions that a series of clear accounting irregularities had destroyed "$1.3bn of shareholder value" in what he described as "a catalogue of calamitous errors and exceptionally poor judgment." The memo concluded with a call for Kikukawa to resign as chairman of Olympus Corporation. Three days later, Kikukawa and his board of directors responded by firing Woodford from his position as CEO. Woodford's personal account of the days that followed his termination reads like a spy novel. Fearing for his life on the basis of a personal belief that the accounting scandal involved members of the yakuza -the Japanese mafia-Woodford left Japan for the United Kingdom very shortly afterward. It was later reported that Woodford was able to provide sufficient evidence to warrant investigation into his claims by the FBI, Scotland Yard's Serious Crime Unit, and Tokyo's Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission. After weeks of denials-and a disconcerting silence among Japan's regulators and mainstream media-the company was forced to concede in the face of incontrovertible evidence that it had misappropriated funds in order to hide investment losses dating back to the 1990s. Public promises were made to introduce a new Corporate Governance Committee and to release five years' worth of revised financial accounts. Kikukawa finally admitted to fraud and stepped down as chairman of Olympus Corporation. He, along with two other Olympus executives, will face up to 10 years in jail for his role in the scandal. In June 2012, Olympus announced that its board of directors had approved a settlement offer with Woodford of 1.2 billion yen ($15.4 million) for unfair dismissal, but the financial impact of the scandal may be far from over. The stock price had plummeted by as much as 80 percent in the immediate postscandal period, and in November 2012, the company announced that 48 mostly foreign institutional investors and pension funds had filed a lawsuit seeking 19.1 billion yen ($240 million) in compensation for investment losses resulting from the revelation of accounting irregularities. Can Olympus recover from this scandal? Why or why not? Sources: The Economist, "The Olympus Scandal: Paying a Price for Doing What's Right," November 24, 2012; Bill Powell, "A Rotten Picture at Olympus," Time, December 12, 2012, and "Scandal at Olympus: The CEO Who Knew Too Much," Time, October 28, 2011; Michael Woodford, Exposure: Inside the Olympus Scandal: How I Went from CEO to Whistleblower (Portfolio, November 2012); Yuri Kageyama, "Olympus Whistleblower Wins Millions in Settlement," Bloomberg Businessweek, June 8, 2012; and Associated Press, "Olympus Investors Seek $240 Million Compensation," November 13, 2012.

Was it ethical for Apotex to include a three-year gag clause in the agreement with Dr. Olivieri?

Even though Dr. Olivieri later admitted that she should never have signed the agreement with Apotex that included a confidentiality clause, does the fact that she did sign it have any bearing on her actions here? Why or why not?

Was Olivieri's decision to publish her findings about the trial an example of universalism or utilitarianism? Explain your answer.

If we identify the key players in this case as Dr. Olivieri, Apotex, the Hospital for Sick Children, and the University of Toronto, what are the conflicts of interest between them all?

What do you think would have happened if Dr. Olivieri's fellow academics had not supported her in her fight?

How could this situation have been handled differently to avoid such a lengthy and bitter battle?