Deck 26: The 2011 Arab Uprisings

Question 1

Who was the twenty-six-year old Tunisian who lit himself on fire in protest of Tunisia's economic stagnation, as well as the abuse, repression, and extortion of its citizens?

A) Khaled Said
B) Sidi Bouzid
C) Mohammed Bouazizi
D) Wael Ghonim

Answer 1

C

Question 2

Why is the date "January 25" relevant within the revolutionary activity of 2011?

A) It was the day Tunisia saw President Ben Ali flee by plane for Saudi Arabia
B) It was the first day of the Egyptian revolution; hundreds of thousands of Egyptians descended into Tahrir Square this day.
C) It marked the end of the Egyptian revolution; Mubarak was successfully removed from power
D) It was the day that marked Libya's first free election

Answer 2

B

Question 3

Who or what took formal executive power in Egypt on February 11, 2011 after the arrest of Husni Mubarak?

A) United Nations Emergency Force
B) Muhammad Morsi
C) Omar Suleiman
D) Supreme Council of Armed Forces

Answer 3

D

Question 4

Which of the following Arab states did NOT experience a violent civil war during the revolutionary events of 2011?

A) Syria
B) Egypt
C) Libya
D) Yemen

Question 5

Instead of the national military, to retain his power Qaddafi relied on the elite units comprised of tribal allies and led by members of his family. Why?

A) The national military defected en masse
B) Large swaths of national military members were killed by NATO attacks early in the uprising
C) The national military had been kept weak to prevent any coup attempts
D) The national military was already spread too thin, as Qaddafi had troops stationed in many neighboring countries

Question 6

In Syria, as with many authoritarian regimes, what did the increased and ongoing repression indicate?

A) It was a sign of desperation from an increasingly isolated regime that saw no alternative to imposing its rule
B) It was a sign of military might and superiority
C) It was an effort by the regime to hold the crumbling state together and not risk civil war
D) It indicated the promise of protection the regime swore to its citizens in the face of the violent rebellious uprisings led by a minority group

Question 7

In which state did the national army show an immediate readiness to kill demonstrators?

A) Egypt
B) Tunisia
C) Syria
D) All of these are correct.

Question 8

Oil-rich Gulf monarchies sought to avoid Tunisian and Egyptian style protests with a strategy that combined ____________.

A) military force and economic repression
B) co-option and coercion
C) leniency and liberalization
D) military force and isolationism

Question 9

The Shi'a majority of Bahrain posed a challenge to the Sunni ruling al-Khalifa family. Which two powers aided Bahrain in silencing this opposition movement?

A) Iran and the United Arab Emirates
B) Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
C) The United States and Saudi Arabia
D) Qatar and Saudi Arabia

Question 10

Which of the following is NOT true of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s?

A) They were motivated by a social-and not strictly religious-agenda
B) They sought to integrate general Islamic principles with responsible social reform
C) They directly challenged the authority of the state
D) By establishing much-needed charity institutions such as hospitals and welfare assistance, they gained legitimacy over the failings of the existing system

Question 11

Which of the following is a country in which there was no change of regime in 2011?

A) Yemen
B) Bahrain
C) Libya
D) Egypt

Question 12

Regimes in the region had over the past several decades, increasingly become half gumhuriya and half malakiya, meaning

A) half republic, half monarchy
B) half democracy, half dictatorship
C) half Islamist, half secular
D) half legitimate, half illegitmate

Question 13

Which of the following countries had been experiencing a youth bulge at the time of the uprisings?

A) Saudi Arabia
B) Egypt
C) Syria
D) All of these answers are correct

Question 14

Which of the following was not among the most significant variables in navigating successful political and economic transitions in the wake of 2011?

A) Structure and composition of the army
B) Historical presence of religious minorities, such as Jews and Christians
C) Outside powers' decisions whether or not to intervene on behalf of the revolutionaries or on behalf of the regime, or at all
D) The process of writing new constitutions

Question 15

Which of the following helped al-Sisi's new regime in Egypt?

A) The US, which refused to label it a coup, quickly resuming its military support to Egypt
B) Billions of dollars of Gulf oil money from the Arab monarchies
C) A coherent military apparatus in Egypt
D) All of these helped in consolidating al-Sisi's regime

Question 16

Who were the Sinai militants?

A) Originally stemming from marginalized Bedouin, a new generation of opponents to the Egyptian military that were ultimately driven towards allegiance to ISIS
B) Islamist rivals to the Muslim Brotherhood who sought Morsi's overthrow
C) Hamas factions within Egypt, heartened by the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power
D) Informal secular factions working on behalf of Mubarak's family to keep the Muslim Brotherhood out of power

Question 17

Which of the following is NOT a reason as to why Bashar al-Asad's regime has remained so resilient?

A) Disorganization among opposition groups, many of which fight one another
B) Immense support from Russia, Iran, and Hizbullah
C) Tight-knit coherence of the regime
D) Loyalty among the Sunnis, who constitute the majority of Syria's population

Question 18

Which of the following is NOT an accurate characterization of the Houthis?

A) As Twelver Shi‛a, these rebels sought to extend Iranian influence throughout the Gulf
B) A local rebel movement of northern Yemen that led to the end of Saleh's presidency in 2011
C) They allied with forces loyal to President Saleh to help oust President Mansour Hadi in 2015
D) They have been the target of a Saudi-led coalition beginning in March 2015

Question 19

Which of the following does NOT explain the longevity of the Syrian civil war?

A) Massive oil resources
B) Bashar al-Asad's tight hold over his inner-circle
C) Generous support to the regime from Iran, Russia, and Hizbullah
D) The lack of unity among, as well as consistent external support for, the opposition groups

Question 20

Which of the following best characterizes Saudi state policy post-2011?

A) Cautious in its actions at home and abroad due to falling oil prices and its shrinking state revenue
B) Engaged in multiple proxy wars with an increasingly aggressive Iran
C) More repressive than ever over its domestic population due in part to workers' protests against poor working conditions
D) Spending massive sums, both on appeasing its own population and to engage in aggressive foreign policy

Question 21

Unlike the police force, the conscript army originally had some legitimacy as a force for national unity in Egypt.

Question 22

Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood made greater gains than secular opposition parties in the parliamentary election process because of their well-established regional networks and organized party structures.

Question 23

The Syrian regime filled key positions in the state apparatus with various ethnic and religious minorities-this effort had long afforded the state some degree of legitimacy.

Question 24

The most credible opposition to failing Arab regimes came from Islamists, either as militant radical minorities or, increasingly, as moderate centrists who work within the system to reform society.

Question 25

As of 2011, the United States has shown moral, fiscal, and military support for all of the democratic uprisings in the Middle East.

Question 26

Due to mass demonstrations and the refusal of the army to fire upon the civilian population, President __________________ of Tunisia stepped down on January 14, 2011.

Question 27

Revolutionary transitions in the Middle East proved to be less bloody in countries where demonstrators face a "national" conscript army, as in Tunisia and __________________, than a more sectarian military force, such as in Syria.

Question 28

Egyptians gathered in __________________ to protest police brutality and to demand "the fall of the regime."

Question 29

Twelve million Syrians were displaced, often more than once, due to the war. Five million of them sought refuge in Jordan, Lebanon, and ____________.

Question 30

Although the United States has long sought to avoid a place for __________________ parties in its promotion of democracy in the Middle East, the events of 2011 have made it clear that such parties must be integrated into the electoral process, as they have a great deal of popular support.

Question 31

How was the use of technology and social media an important part of the Arab Spring revolutions?

Question 32

What connotations do the terms "Arab Spring" and "Arab Awakening" have for the 2011 revolutions?

Question 33

What were some of the common grievances shared throughout the states engaging in revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world?

Question 34

Describe some of the range of international and regional observations of the Western intervention in Libya.

Question 35

How has the United States misrepresented Islamic activism throughout the world, and why is this detrimental to their foreign policy objectives?

Question 36

What was ironic about the Egyptian state's commemoration in 2011 of a British attack on its police in 1952?

Question 37

Explain the significance of the deep state for revolution.

Question 38

Briefly explain the challenges faced by Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party from the start.

Question 39

Briefly describe some of the reasons as to why Syria initially appeared immune to the waves of protest engulfing the region in 2011.

Question 40

How did the Syrian regime utilize the discourse of radical Islam to its advantage?

Question 41

To what degree is the Arab Spring of 2011 and its ensuing legacy comparable with the 1950s era of revolution in the Arab world? Be sure to bring in specific examples of local reasons for discontent among populations as well as the role of foreign powers.

Question 42

Was it right for the United Nations Security Council to authorize intervention in Libya in 2011 for the sake of protecting civilians? Or, was it inevitable for the NATO-led intervention that ensued to result in the chaos that has since engulfed Libya? Consider in your answer to what degree the Libyan intervention and its aftermath is comparable with that of Iraq in 2003 (refer back to Chapter 25 on Iraq), and to what extent it impacted upon the war in Syria.