Deck 4: A Society-Centered Approach to Trade Politics

Question 1

A society-centered approach to trade politics argues that

A) a government's trade policy objectives are not shaped by politicians' responses to interest group demands.
B) a government's trade policy objectives are shaped by politicians' responses to interest group demands.
C) a government's trade policy objectives are shaped by rational choices among strong economic models.
D) trade largely has no distributional consequences.
E) distributional consequences from trade only creates winners.

Answer 1

B

Question 2

The factor and sector models both argue that

A) globalization is good.
B) globalization is not good.
C) trade policy preferences are not determined by the income consequences of trade.
D) trade policy preferences are determined by the income consequences of trade.
E) trade politics is driven by the conflicts between business and labor.

Answer 2

D

Question 3

Supply side models of trade politics find considerable agreement

A) that political institutions do not play an important role in transforming interest group demands into actual policies.
B) about how political institutions play an important role in transforming interest group demands into actual policies.
C) that political institutions do not play an important role in transforming interest group demands into actual policies by establishing rules that influence strategies.
D) that political institutions do not play an important role in transforming interest group demands into actual policies by enforcing rules that influence strategies.
E) that political institutions play an important role in transforming interest group demands into actual policies by establishing rules that influence strategies.

Answer 3

E

Question 4

The sector model assumes that

A) factors are not easily moved from one industry to another.
B) factors are easily moved from one industry to another.
C) factors are not specific to the sector in which they are currently employed.
D) geography of industry location does not mean workers have to physically relocate.
E) logistical obstacles to physical relocation are not insurmountable.

Question 5

The model that argues that trade politics are driven by competition between competition between labor and capital is called

A) the sector model.
B) the liberal model.
C) the conservative model.
D) the factor model.
E) the distributional model.

Question 6

The logic of collective action helps us understand several important characteristics of trade politics in advanced industrial countries including that

A) consumers, rather than producers, dominate trade politics.
B) export-oriented sectors demanding liberalization dominate trade politics.
C) import-competing sectors demanding liberalization dominate trade politics.
D) reciprocal trade agreements make it harder for export-oriented industries.
E) governments often liberalize unilaterally.

Question 7

Most scholars argue that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)of 1934

A) delegated the President the authority to increase tariffs in exchange for equivalent concessions from foreign governments.
B) authorized the Congress to reduce tariffs in exchange for equivalent concessions from foreign governments.
C) transformed the large heterogeneous group favoring liberalization into smaller groups of export-oriented industries that could more easily organize.
D) transformed the smaller homogeneous group favoring protectionism into larger groups of export-oriented industries that could more easily organize.
E) transformed the smaller homogeneous group favoring liberalization into larger groups of export-oriented industries that could more easily organize.

Question 8

Which of the following is NOT an important characteristic of trade politics illustrated by the logic of collective action?

A) Producers, rather than consumers, dominate trade politics.
B) Import-competing sectors demanding protectionism dominate trade politics.
C) Individual consumers have a strong incentive to organize and campaign to influence trade policy.
D) Individual consumers face a strong incentive to be a free rider.
E) Individual consumers have few incentives to organize and campaign to influence trade policy.

Question 9

The tendency for trade to cause factor prices to converge is known as the

A) factor mobility theorem.
B) import competing theorem.
C) Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
D) Hecksher-Ohlin theorem.
E) factor price differentiation theorem.

Question 10

Electoral systems that distribute legislative representation in accordance with the share of the popular vote are best called

A) majoritarian systems.
B) run-off systems.
C) proportional representation systems.
D) single party systems.
E) multi-party systems.

Question 11

Examples of export-oriented sectors in the United States are

A) textiles
B) coal
C) clothing
D) pharmaceuticals
E) footwear

Question 12

The sector model predicts that

A) trade politics are driven by competition between high skill workers.
B) trade politics are driven by competition between industries.
C) trade politics are driven by competition between low skill workers.
D) trade politics are driven by competition between capital and labor.
E) trade politics are driven by competition between union and non-union workers.

Question 13

The model that argues that trade politics are driven by competition between two industries is called

A) the sector model.
B) the distributional model.
C) the factor model.
D) the pluralist model.
E) the competition model.

Question 14

Electoral systems affect trade policies in which ways?

A) Majoritarian systems may encourage organization around common factor-based interests.
B) Proportional representation (PR) systems may encourage organization around common sector-based interests.
C) Majoritarian systems may encourage organization around broad industry interests.
D) Proportional representation (PR) systems may encourage organization around common factor-based interests.
E) Proportional representation (PR) systems may encourage organization around interests in their own districts.

Question 15

Trade between the United States and China has caused changes in the incomes earned by workers and capitalists in both countries.Which of the following statements is NOT true?

A) Abundant Chinese labor has gained from trade.
B) Abundant Chinese capital has gained from trade.
C) Abundant American capital has gained from trade.
D) Scarce American labor has lost from trade.
E) Scarce Chinese capital has lost from trade.

Question 16

In a two-factor model,the emergence of conflict between workers and capitalists is based on the assumption that in America

A) labor is homogeneous.
B) trade reduces the income of high skill workers.
C) high skill workers are more abundant.
D) trade increases the income of low skill workers
E) low skill workers are more abundant.

Question 17

The factor model predicts that

A) labor will prefer protectionist trade policies in developing countries.
B) owners of capital will prefer liberal trade policies in developing countries.
C) labor will prefer will prefer liberal trade policies in developed countries.
D) owners of capital will prefer liberal trade policies in developed countries.
E) owners of capital will prefer protectionist trade policies in developed countries.

Question 18

Examples of import-competing sectors in the United States are

A) computers
B) biotechnology
C) aircraft
D) solar energy
E) shoes

Question 19

The factor model assumes that

A) factors are not highly mobile from one industry to another.
B) people's economic interests are not determined by their factor ownership.
C) people's economic interests are determined by their factor ownership.
D) logistical obstacles to physical relocation are insurmountable.
E) factors are specific to the sector in which they are currently employed.

Question 20

Electoral systems that combine single member districts and first-past-the-post elections are best called

A) proportional representation systems.
B) majoritarian systems.
C) modified proportional representation systems.
D) systems that advantage smaller third parties.
E) systems that advantage party coalitions.

Question 21

A political actor whose agreement is necessary in order to enact policy is

A) called a veto player.
B) called a maverick player.
C) called a poker player.
D) not usually present in unified government.
E) not usually present in divided government.

Question 22

Applied to trade policy,

A) political systems with few veto players will find it more difficult to alter tariffs in response to societal pressure for change.
B) political systems with many veto players will find it easier to alter tariffs in response to societal pressure for change.
C) liberalization rises more sharply in recessions in countries with more veto players.
D) protectionism rises more sharply in recessions in countries with fewer veto players.
E) political systems with many veto players will find it more difficult to alter tariffs in response to societal pressure for change.

Question 23

Which of the following is NOT a weakness of the society-centered approach to understanding trade politics?

A) It incorrectly assumes that politicians play no autonomous role in trade politics.
B) It doesn't adequately address the motivations of noneconomic actors in trade politics.
C) It doesn't adequately address how to measure the balance of power between interests.
D) It gives us less guidance about how trade shapes the fortunes of different groups in society.
E) It gives us less guidance about who will win the political battle.

Question 24

Explain how producer groups rather than consumer groups can more easily organize to lobby government in the pursuit of their desired trade policy.

Question 25

The society-centered approach helps us understand trade politics because it has several strengths.

A) It more adequately explains who will win the political battle.
B) It gives us more guidance about how to measure the balance of power between interests.
C) It more correctly assumes that politicians play no autonomous role in trade politics.
D) It more adequately addresses the motivations of noneconomic actors in trade politics.
E) It gives us more guidance about how trade shapes the fortunes of different groups in society.

Question 26

Explain the similarities between collective action and public goods problems.

Question 27

The society-centered approach does not address the motivations of noneconomic actors in trade politics.

Question 28

Electoral systems that combine single member districts and first-past-the-post elections are best called proportional representation systems.

Question 29

Both the factor and the sector model of trade policy preferences agree that raising and lowering tariffs redistributes income.

Question 30

A society-centered approach argues that a government's trade policy objectives are shaped by politicians' responses to interest group demands.

Question 31

The sector model assumes that factors are not easily moved from one industry to another.

Question 32

We would expect governments with PR systems to maintain

A) lower tariffs because large groups benefit more from protectionism.
B) lower tariffs because small groups benefit more from protectionism.
C) lower tariffs than majoritarian electoral systems.
D) higher tariffs than majoritarian electoral systems.
E) higher tariffs because large groups benefit more from protectionism.

Question 33

Explain the differences between the factor and sector models of trade policy preferences regarding factor mobility.

Question 34

The factor model predicts that labor will prefer protectionist trade policies in developing countries.

Question 35

The tendency for trade to cause factor prices to converge is known as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.

Question 36

By the logic of collective action,consumers,rather than producers,dominate trade politics.

Question 37

What do scholars argue were the effects of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)of 1934?

Question 38

Supply side models of trade politics find considerable agreement that political institutions play an important role in transforming interest group demands into actual policies by establishing rules that influence strategies.

Question 39

Explain the differences between the factor and sector models of trade policy preferences regarding income distributions.

Question 40

The sector model predicts that trade politics are driven by competition between capital and labor.

Question 41

How do the differences between majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems affect trade politics?

Question 42

Explain how the number of veto players influences trade policy decisions.

Question 43

What are the weaknesses of the society-centered approach to trade politics?

Question 44

Explain how trade politics is driven by conflicts between import-competing and export-oriented industries.

Question 45

What are the differences between majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems?