Jaheim and Suzanna are playing a game involving repeated iterations of a simultaneous-move prisoner's dilemma.In each round,both players choose either "cooperate" or "defect." Neither Jaheim nor Suzanna knows when the game will end.If Jaheim believes that Suzanna will be playing tit for tat,then
A) he will maximize his payoffs by defecting in every round.
B) cooperation will be impossible to maintain regardless of the strategy he plays.
C) cooperation might be possible if he also plays tit for tat.
D) cooperation might be possible if he plays a strategy where he defects in every round.
E) cooperation might be possible if he plays a strategy where he defects in the first round,cooperates in the second round,and defects in every other round.

Question

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

If Jaheim believes that Suzanna is playing tit for tat, then he can increase his own payoffs by also playing tit for tat. This means that in the first round, Jaheim will cooperate, and then in each subsequent round, he will do whatever Suzanna did in the previous round. This strategy can lead to mutual cooperation and better overall payoffs for both players. However, if Jaheim defects in every round, then cooperation is impossible to maintain regardless of Suzanna's strategy, and the payoffs for both players will be lower.

Jaheim and Suzanna Are Playing a Game Involving Repeated Iterations