If monitoring by a principal is imperfect, it is less likely that a moral hazard problem will arise.
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Q3: Arrow's impossibility theorem suggests that a voting
Q4: Both adverse selection and signalling are linked
Q5: Efficiency wages increase the cost of shirking.
Q6: In the moral hazard problem the principal
Q7: Adverse selection is a problem that arises
Q9: A difference in access to relevant knowledge
Q10: The Condorcet paradox illustrates that majority voting
Q11: The median voter theorem is used to
Q12: Information asymmetries do not impede the efficient
Q14: Screening is an action taken by an
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